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Congress Should Engage in Sentencing Review: Some
Ideas for the 111th Congress
The June 2oo8 edition of the Federal Sentencing Reporter
highlighted a fact that we have all witnessed this election
season: crime and criminal justice policy are not at the top
of the list of political concerns. And the presidential and
congressional candidates certainly are not campaigning on
a platform of sentencing reform. Given the country's cur-
rent economic concerns, it is unlikely that criminal justice
policy, let alone sentencing policy, will be the first concern
for either a new Congress or a new administration. But
these issues definitely should not be the last. Sentencing
and criminal justice policy should take a prominent place
in the agenda for the iuth Congress. The Supreme Court
has left the sentencing "ball" in Congress's court.' It is
time for Congress to engage in the process.
Since the Booker decision, Congress has demonstrated,
for the most part, remarkable restraint against "tinkering"
with the system, a fact owed in large measure to the efforts of
the United States Sentencing Commission to keep Congress
informed about federal sentencing trends.2 The Commission
has done an admirable job in turning around its data collec-
tion, analysis, and reporting functions to provide Congress,
and the entire criminal justice system, with useful statistics
and information that suggest the system is not falling apart.
For example, the Commission's efforts demonstrate, as
Frank Bowman noted, that the average sentence in federal
cases did rise between the pre-Booker 2005 time period
(median sentences of 43.8 months) and fiscal year 2007 (51.8
months). Looking at this statistic suggests that the system is
not spinning out of control across the board resulting in
every federal offender receiving a probationary sentence.
Moreover, despite the Department of Justice's concerns
immediately after Booker that it would lose leverage to gain
cooperation from defendants, not only has the rate of sub-
stantial assistance motions remained relatively steady, the
percentage of government-sponsored below-range sentences
has continued to increase since Booker)
However, the trend in sentencing increases may be at
an end. The average sentence length reported by the Com-
mission did not change between fiscal year 2oo6 and
fiscal year 2007, and recently released data for the third
quarter of fiscal year 2oo8 demonstrate an average sen-
tence length of 50.9 months.4 But focusing on average
sentence lengths does not help move the criminal justice
system from being one that is "good enough" to one that
reflects not only the goals and purposes of sentencing, but
the core values of this country, a fact dearly recognized by
the contributors to the June 20o8 edition of the Federal
Sentencing Reporter. A far more sophisticated analysis and
review is required.
The Supreme Court has significantly altered the sen-
tencing landscape, perhaps more so with its Rita,5 Gall,
6
and Kimbrough7 decisions than it did even with Booker.
These post-Booker decisions helped define the remedial
holding in Booker but more than that, they further
enhanced the role of the judiciary perhaps at the expense
of congressional sentencing authority. It is time for Con-
gress to engage in the sentencing review process as part of
its overall review of criminal justice policy and determine
what role it desires to play in the sentencing process. As
part of its review, Congress must determine whether it can
be content to set only statutory maxima (and, for now,
minima) thus leaving intervening sentences to judicial
discretion8 or whether it wants to continue to exercise
more authority over the spectrum of sentencing within the
bounds of the Constitution.9
Becoming engaged in the sentencing review process
does not mean massive overhaul in a short period of time.
There are several actions that Congress could take that
would result in immediate improvements to the federal
sentencing system, and provide Congress with the tools it
needs to begin its evaluation of sentencing policy. What
follows are my top five recommendations for the ith Con-
gress. The first three I believe will result in relatively little
political consternation for Congress. The last two sugges-
tions are more political but nonetheless should be
undertaken quickly for the good of the system.
I. Request More Prison Impact Assessments
Congress has a very important yet under-utilized tool at its
disposal for assessing the affects of criminal legislation on
the community: prison impact assessments. Congress
must start requesting more prison impact assessments as
part of its promulgation of criminal sentencing policy.
Section 4047 of title 18, United States Code, directs the
Commission and the Department of Justice to provide
"information relating to a pending measure or matter that
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might affect the number of defendants processed through
the Federal criminal justice system.""0 A prison impact
assessment shall include
i. projections of the impact on prison, probation, and
post-prison supervision populations;
2. an estimate of the fiscal impact of such population
changes on Federal expenditures, including those
for construction and operation of correctional facili-
ties for the current fiscal year and five succeeding
fiscal years;
3. an analysis of any other significant factor affecting the
cost of the measure and its impact on the operations
of components of the criminal justice system; and
4. a statement of the methodologies and assumptions
utilized in preparing the assessment."
The Commission provides prison impacts to Congress
in a variety of ways. For example, congressional staff may
ask for prison impact as a bill is progressing through com-
mittee. For, example, the House Judiciary Committee
fairly regularly asks for prison impact assessments or
other similar types of information when a bill is being
considered in committee.'2 It also routinely requests such
assessments when a bill is reported out of committee.
When that occurs, the Commission works with the Con-
gressional Budget Office to produce a prison impact
assessment, which is incorporated into the bill's budget
estimate. The Commission generally supplies the number
of beds affected and other matters of interest and the Con-
gressional Budget Office provides the cost of those beds.'3
Interestingly, prison impact assessment requests were far
more common during the io 9 th Congress when every bill
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee contained
a mandatory minimum provision.'4
Even more important than prison impact assessments
for individual bills, Congress should require the Depart-
ment of Justice to comply with the reporting requirements
set forth in section 4047(c). That section requires that by
March i of every year, the Department of Justice provide to
Congress "a prison impact assessment reflecting the
cumulative effect of all relevant changes in the law taking
effect during the preceding calendar year."'5 Requiring the
Department of Justice to comply with this reporting
requirement would provide significant insight into the for-
mulation of criminal justice policy because the reporting
requirement covers all criminal justice legislation, not just
that implementing statutory mandatory minima. Congress
should include review of this report in its regular Depart-
ment oversight hearings. Doing so would allow Congress
and the Department to assess the previous year's criminal
justice policy in a meaningful and effective manner.
II. Reaffirm the Appropriateness of Statutory
Directives to the Commission
Seventy-four bills were introduced during the iioth Con-
gress containing directives to the Commission.' 6
Ultimately, eight bills were enacted with directives to the
Commission on substantive criminal law including dis-
aster fraud,'7 theft from veterans' memorials,'8 drug
trafficking,'9 and regulation of online pharmacies and
controlled substances.1° Complying with these directives
will require a considerable amount of work by the Com-
mission to independently evaluate each of these areas
and ascertain what, if any, Guideline amendments are
appropriate.
Many have suggested over the years that when the
Commission receives a directive from Congress that
directive usurps the Commission's independence and
the resulting Guidelines are, therefore, infirm.2 This
line of criticism has taken on new meaning since the
Court concluded in Kimbrough that sentencing courts
could disagree with a Guideline on policy grounds,
including that the Commission did not exercise its tra-
ditional, independent role when formulating the
Guideline.2 2 This language is now being used repeatedly
by defense counsel to attack the reasonableness of a
Guideline sentence in instances where the guideline
was promulgated as a result of a congressional
directive.23
Congress must address this erosion of its ability to
express its sentencing intent through the Commission.
The Commission always prefers that Congress not
include directives in legislation; however, directives often
are the result of a legislative compromise to pass a bill
that otherwise would not have been passed or, worse,
would have been passed with statutory minimum manda-
tory sentences.
Congress, in the short term, should address the
issue of directives in legislation and particularly the
post-Gall/Kimbrough critique being leveled against them
by (i) specifically recognizing congressional authority
over sentencing and the propriety of exercising that
authority through statutory directives; and (2) issuing
only broad directives to the Commission to "study and
amend" the Guidelines, which combines analysis and
appropriate amendments in a way that "closely adheres
to the manner in which the Sentencing Reform Act
indicated the Sentencing Commission should the evolu-
tionary task of improving its guidelines and policy
statements."24
Congress gave the Commission a very dear set of
instructions to follow when promulgating Guidelines or
amendments thereto. Those instructions are set out in
both titles i8 and 28 and include a totality of circum-
stances to be considered. Congress should not impede
that analysis by issuing specific directives such as specific
enhancement levels for a particular offense5 or directing
the Commission to interpret changes made by an Act in a
certain way.' 6 Congress can and should direct sentencing
policy from the minimum through the maximum but it
should do so carefully and in a way that relies on the tool
that it created to undertake this process: the independent
Commission.
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Ill. Instruct the Commission to Take the Lead in
Sentencing Review and Require Detailed and
Specific Information
Congress should demonstrate the same thoughtful, bi-parti-
san approach to sentencing review that it did during the
reform movement that led to passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act. The principles that guided that reform move-
ment should be reaffirmed by Congress and used as the
framework for its latest review of sentencing policy. The initial
review of sentencing policy should be removed, to the furthest
extent possible, from political machinations and be based on
sound evidentiary findings. How can Congress, a political
body like no other, accomplish such a task? For starters, Con-
gress should embrace the Commissiorts apparent desire to
take a leading role in the sentencing review process.
In its recently published priorities for the year, the Com-
mission indicates that it hopes to continue its work with all
three branches of government on issues of interest since
Booker. Specifically, the Commission may consider
(A) an evaluation of the impact of those decisions on
the federal sentencing guideline system, (B) develop-
ment of amendments to the federal sentencing
guidelines, (C) development of recommendations for
legislation regarding federal sentencing policy, and (D)
a study of statutory mandatory minimum penalties. 27
Congress should require the Commission provide
detailed and meaningful analyses of the state of federal
sentencing in this country, including requesting specific
information that provides-
s. Detailed and comprehensive analysis of individual
offense types, including by drug type;2
8
2. Detailed regional and interregional studies of sen-
tencing trends;29
3. Detailed assessments of any racial disparities aris-
ing in the system;30
4. Detailed analysis of the increase in noncitizens in
the federal system; 3'
5. Detailed examination of mandatory minimum sen-
tences and their interaction with an advisory
Guideline system;32
6. Detailed analysis of the use of acquitted, dismissed,
or uncharged conduct at sentencing;33 and
7. Specific statutory and Guideline amendments that
would allow the sentencing system to operate more
effectively, including the efficacy of expanding the
safety valvey4 retaining or repealing the "25 percent
rule,"35 de-linking the Guidelines from mandatory
minimums,36 statutory relief from some or all con-
gressional directives, inclusion of more alternatives
to incarceration, 37 and other suggestions that the
Commission deems appropriate.
Congress expected the Commission to be the expert on
federal sentencing issues and provide it with advice and
guidance on the evolution of sentencing.3 The Commis-
sion should revel in that role and engage all of its
resources to this end. The Commission is uniquely situ-
ated to interact with all the relevant stakeholders in
sentencing policy, including holding national and regional
hearings, conducting detailed analysis of sentencing infor-
mation, and processing information in a bipartisan,
independent way. Congress should let the Commission
operate and report back within a year or so with the infor-
mation Congress can use to further structure sentencing
in this country.
The last two recommendations are political in nature
and will require Congress to act in consultation with a
new administration. Taking such action may not be palat-
able to a new Congress and a new administration but they
are essential to the effective operation of federal sentenc-
ing policy.
IV. Ensure a Full Slate of Commissioners
In the waning days of the iioth Congress, members qui-
etly undid one of the more opaque provisions of the 2003
PROTECT Act, which required that no more than three of
the Commissions members could be federal judges.3 9
Nothing in the legislative history of the PROTECT Act
provides background for this change, which did not
appear in the Act until very early in the morning of the
day it was debated on the Senate floor. The provision gar-
nered a great deal of criticism and remained one of the
most uncomfortable results of the PROTECT Act that the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence could not affect.
As part of the Judicial Administration and Technical
Amendments Act of 2oo8,4° Congress returned the lan-
guage to its pre-PROTECT Act days so that membership
of the Commission must contain at least three federal
judges, thus reinstating the language that Congress
included in the Sentencing Reform Act.
As discussed above, the Commission provides Con-
gress with an independent, expert body designed to be the
clearinghouse on federal sentencing issues.4' The Com-
mission has demonstrated its ability to inform the
criminal justice system time and time again since the
Booker decision about matters of federal sentencing prac-
tice and its independent, expert voice on the subject has
quelled fears of an advisory system run amok. Congress
should expect the Commission to take a leadership role in
the sentencing review process. To that end, Congress and
a new administration must ensure that the Commission
remains at full strength.
V. Conclusively Address the Issue of Federal Cocaine
Sentencing
Congress must move past the politics associated with this
topic and condusively address the unwarranted disparity
that currently exists between federal crack cocaine and
powder cocaine sentences. While the Commissions actions
in this area are laudable, they did not adequately address
the problems associated with this piece of criminal justice
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policy. In fact, because the Commission could only adjust
the Guidelines slightly because of the required linkage to
the mandatory minimums established by Congress, it
could be argued that the Commission's action introduced
even more disparity into the system because of the wide
range of drug ratios that now exist between crack cocaine
and powder cocaine. The sentencing provisions governing
federal cocaine offenses result in such a negative percep-
tion of criminal justice in this country that they simply
cannot be justified.42
If Congress undertakes even some of the actions out-
lined above, the federal sentencing system in this country
will operate more effectively and a thorough examination
of sentencing without respect to politics is possible.
Notes
* Lisa Rich is currently a visiting professor of law at the Univer-
sity of Wyoming's College of Law where she is teaching
constitutional law, legal writing, legislation, and federal sen-
tencing. Before entering full-time academia, Ms. Rich was the
Director of Legislative and Public Affairs for the United
States Sentencing Commission.
1 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2 The change in congressional leadership during the 110th
Congress of course also contributed to the lack of response
to Booker and its progeny but even the 109th Congress was
relatively contained in its response to Booker relying as it did
on mandatory minima for specific offenses rather than a
wholesale sentencing "fix."
3 Compare U.S. Sentencing Commission 2005 Sourcebook of
Sentencing Statistics, Fig. G (post-Booker 2005) with U.S.
Sentencing Commission 2006 Sourcebook of Sentencing
Statistics, tbl. N; U.S. Sentencing Commission 2007 Source-
book of Sentencing Statistics, tbl. N; and U.S. Sentencing
Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data, tbl. 1 (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/USSC_2008QuarterReport_
3rd.pdf). A note of caution on this overall statistic is impor-
tant, however. The number of immigration cases also has
significantly increased during this time period so the number
of "fast track" or "early disposition" departures has
increased, which appear to have contributed somewhat to the
increase in government sponsored below-range sentences.
4 Compare U.S. Sentencing Commission 2005 Sourcebook of
Sentencing Statistics, tbl. 13 (pre-Booker); U.S. Sentencing
Commission 2006 Sourcebook of Sentencing Statistics, tbl.
13; U.S. Sentencing Commission 2007 Sourcebook of Sen-
tencing Statistics, tbl. 13 with U.S. Sentencing Commission
Preliminary Quarterly Data, tbl. 19 (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sccases/USSC_2008_QuarterReport-
3rd.pdf). The drop in average sentence length in fiscal year
2008 could be attributable to the Commission's recent activ-
ity with respect to crack cocaine offenses, which comprise a
significant number of cases in the federal docket. If the aver-
age sentence length for fiscal year 2008 does in fact turn out
to be lower than previous years, the Commission should try
to ascertain what caused the decrease, specifically whether
the decrease is due to the change in crack cocaine sentences.
5 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
6 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
7 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
8 Many critics now argue that a directive to the Commission is
just that, a directive to the Commission and not the courts
and therefore, there should be no congressional directives
because in an advisory system, the Guidelines are now just
one factor to be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Con-
gress should consider this argument and if it determines
that a directive to the Commission is, by the nature of the
interaction between titles 28 and 18, United States Code, a
direction to the courts, it should reaffirm that belief.
9 As discussed in more detail, infra, it certainly seems as if
Congress desires to exercise authority over sentencing
beyond setting minima and maxima given the number of
directives Congress issued to the Commission during the
1 10th Congress. The 1 10th Congress certainly seems to have
believed that the Commission's independence and expertise
in setting penalties through the Guidelines was a better alter-
native than establishing statutory mandatory minima or
amending the Guidelines directly.
10 18 U.S.C. § 4047(b) (West 2008).
11 Id.
12 Because of its internal processes, the Senate is less likely to
issue a report accompanying legislation or request a budget
assessment of pending legislation but it could still utilize
section 4047 as part of its deliberative processes.
13 This arrangement between the Commission and the Congres-
sional Budget Office is somewhat informal and is the result of
concerns expressed early in the Commission's existence that
it report financial projections associated with prison impact
assessments. As a result, the Commission provides the raw
number of beds and other substantive information to the
Congressional Budget Office, which then gets the cost per
bed from the Bureau of Prisons. The resulting cost is then
made a part of the final budget estimate and report that
accompanies a piece of legislation.
14 The Commission's statutory prison impact assessments are
limited in the information they can model; a change in the
statutory maximum, for example, is too difficult to model
because there is no way of knowing where between the mini-
mum and maximum a sentence might fall. Modeling the
difference between no minimum and a set minimum can be
accomplished easily. This should not dissuade Congress from
aggressively using section 4047 as part of its criminal justice
policymaking. Certainly, there should be a way to provide
prison impact assessments on pending legislation as this is a
tool commonly employed by state sentencing commissions.
15 18 U.S.C. § 4047(c) (West 2008). 1 am not aware of this
report ever having been filed during my tenure at the Com-
mission. Perhaps it is part of other annual Department
reports but Congress should require that it be sent separately
given the significant contribution it could make to the formu-
lation of criminal justice policy.
16 Some of these bills represent multiple versions of a single
substantive bill.
17 Pub. L. 110-179, 121 Stat. 2556 (2008),
18 Pub. L. 110-384 (2008) (directing the Commission to ensure
enhanced penalties for theft of veterans' memorials and
grave markers).
19 Pub. L. 110-407 (2008) (directing the Commission to review
and amend the Guidelines, if necessary, for drug trafficking
crimes involving submersible vessels).
20 Pub. L. 110-425 (2008) (directing the Commission to review
the Guideline penalties for certain scheduled substances).
21 The Commission's Fifteen Year Review is often cited to sup-
port this attack on congressional directives. See generally,
U.S. Sentencing Commission Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sen-
tencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal
Justice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform 77
(2004). But the Fifteen Year Review does not necessarily
reflect the current, or former, Commission's view of direc-
tives. For example, the Commission's 1991 Report to
Congress on mandatory minimum penalties noted that while
specific directives to the Commission may be "in tension"
with the Commission's fundamental independence, a "'study
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and amend' directive is a highly effective means of congres-
sional influence over sentencing policy. Special Report to
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal
Justice System 121, 124 (1991). As part of its review of the
sentencing system, the current Commission should review
the statements in the Fifteen Year Review and the Commis-
sion's other reports to determine if empirical evidence and
national experience continue to support them.
22 Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570. In its recent submission to the
Commission on its proposed priorities, the Federal Defenders
suggest that Booker's full "positive impact" "will not be felt"
until the Commission "amends those guidelines that are not
based on empirical evidence or national experience." Letter
to Ricardo H. Hinojosa from Jon M. Sands at 4 (Sept. 8,
2008). The Defenders specifically suggest that the Commis-
sion "not take any action to implement crime legislation
unless it is based on its own expert evaluation of the need for
changes in the guideline structure." Id. at 46.
23 The Federal Defenders Service has launched an extensive
research program that seeks to "deconstruct" the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and provide defense counsel with
arguments against Guidelines promulgated as a result of
congressional directive, particularly those covering child
pornography offenses and career offenders. See the Federal
Defenders Sentencing Resource page, Deconstructing the
Guidelines project at http://www.fd.org/odstb-SentencingRe-
source3.htm#DECONS. Sentencing courts have taken these
arguments to heart and several have concluded that the
Guidelines were not the product of the Commission's inde-
pendent and expert decision-making could be disregarded.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F3d 221 (1st Circuit
2008) (fast track); United States v. Sanchez, 517 F3d 651 (2d
Cir. 2008) (career offender); United States v. Rausch, _ F
Supp. 2d, 2008 WL 3411819 (D. Col., Aug. 13. 2008) (child
pornography). Admittedly, the government opened the door
to this argument in its Kimbrough brief in which it stated that
as long as "Congress expresses its will wholly through the
Guidelines system, the policies in the Guidelines will best be
understood as advisory under Booker." Br. of the United
States at 29.
24 1991 Mandatory Minimum Report at 124. As Paul Hofer sug-
gests in the June 2008 Federal Sentencing Reporter, an
"advisory system with guidelines based on research, consul-
tation with front-line participants, and reasoned deliberation"
is an effective system. That system can coexist with congres-
sional directives if those directives are tailored effectively.
25 See, e.g., H.R. 5652, the Child Sexual Slavery Prevention Act
of 2008, which directs the Commission to amend USSG
§2H4.1 to provide, among other things, a four-level increase
in the base offense levels; a six-level I increase if the victim is
under the age of eighteen. As another example, when H.R.
3480 (see n.19, supra) was originally introduced, the legisla-
tion directed the Commission to review and amend the
Guidelines to provide a sentencing enhancement desecration
or theft of veteran's grave markers. Working with congres-
sional staff, the Commission was able to change the directive
to allow the Commission to exercise its own independent
analysis of the Guidelines and amend the Guidelines only "if
appropriate." This type of directive best expresses congres-
sional intent and allows the Commission to act based on
empirical evidence and its own independent analysis.
26 The directive in H.R. 6353, the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy
Consumer Protection Act of 2008, is an example of a direc-
tive that is, in my opinion, too specific and establishes bad
precedent for future directives. The act directs the Commis-
sion to review the Guidelines and amend them in accordance
with the act but not to consider increases in statutory max-
ima for certain scheduled substances as the sole reason to
amend the Guidelines. The Commission does not consider
increases in statutory maxima as the only reason to increase
penalties under the Guidelines. The Sentencing Reform Act
articulates specific factors that the Commission must con-
sider whenever it promulgates an amendment to the
Guidelines, and changes in statutory maxima are one of
those factors. If Congress was concerned about this being
the "sole" reason the Commission would act, it could have
expressed concern in another way, such as through report
language or floor statements. Now, it appears that either the
Commission routinely considers statutory maxima increases
as the only reason to increase a Guideline (which it does not)
and this directive represents the new norm, or worse, if
future commissions were of such a mind, they could inter-
pret this directive as isolated and the next time a directive
does not contain such language, determine that increases in
statutory maxima alone are sufficient for changes to the
Guideline. Either way, this directive is an unnecessary instruc-
tion to the Commission that sets bad precedent for future
congressional and Commission action.
27 Federal Register Notice of Final Priorities, BAC2211 -01,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/20080908_
Finalpriorities.pdf.
28 As part of this analysis, the Commission should provide a
detailed report of the effect of its crack cocaine amendment,
including whether that is the cause of the apparent drop in
national average sentence length. The Commission should
also include a report on the impact of the crack cocaine
amendment's retroactive application. It was apparent during
the 1 10th Congress that some in Congress were concerned
about the Commission's authority to give retroactive effect to
an amendment without congressional input. See 28 U.S.C. §
994(u). The Commission should take the opportunity to
demonstrate to Congress that its original decision to give this
authority to the Commission was appropriate.
29 There is growing concern about regional and inter-district dis-
parities arising across the country. The Commission should
provide Congress a detailed accounting of sentencing prac-
tices so that if such disparities exist, Congress and the
criminal justice community can determine if they are in fact
unwarranted.
30 Senator Biden and Representative Cohen introduced compan-
ion bills in the 110th Congress calling for an examination of
racial and ethnic disparities throughout the criminal justice
process, from charging through sentencing. See S. 3245 and
H.R. 6518 (both entitled "Justice Integrity Act of 2008").
Both bills direct the Attorney General to establish an advisory
group comprised of policy stakeholders throughout the crim-
inal justice process including U.S. attorneys, defense
counsel, judges, and community activists. Hopefully, these
bills will be introduced in the 11 1th Congress and if they are,
Congress should seriously consider involving the Commission
in this process. The Commission has unique (and immediate)
access to a variety of sentencing-related information that
could assist in this important evaluation.
31 This analysis should include issues associated with non-citi-
zens ineligibility for alternatives to incarceration and
rehabilitative programs that may be available for citizen
offenders.
32 The Commission should provide Congress a current report
similar to its 1991 mandatory minimum report. This report
should expand upon the testimony Judge Hinojosa gave dur-
ing the House mandatory minimum hearing in June 2007,
including a detailed examination of how the increased sever-
ity and number of mandatory minimums have impacted the
system since 1991. Historically, the Commission opposed
mandatory minimums because the Guidelines themselves
were mandatory and could provide certainty and trans-
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parency in a way that was not "one-size-fits-all." Clearly, that
is no longer the case and the Commission should provide
specific reasons why it believes mandatory minimums are not
necessary in an advisory system, if that is what it believes.
33 Significant criticism has been levied against the Commission
and federal sentencing practices resulting from the use of
acquitted, dismissed, or uncharged conduct during sentenc-
ing. Courts have upheld the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing, even after Booker. And 18 U.S.C. § 3661 specifi-
cally states that a court is not limited as to what information
it may consider at sentencing. It remains offensive to many;
however, that conduct for which a defendant was acquitted,
in particular, can be used at sentencing. During Representa-
tive Bobby Scott's "Crime Summit" in June 2007,
suggestions were made that acquitted conduct is used to sen-
tence defendants in the majority of federal cases. Given that
barely 3 percent of federal cases go to trial, it is impossible
that acquitted conduct is used with any real frequency. To bet-
ter understand the frequency with which courts consider
such conduct, the Commission should provide a detailed
analysis of those cases that have gone to trial. It may be
more difficult to provide information on the use of dismissed
or uncharged conduct but the Commission is the best place
to start for such information.
34 The Commission has repeatedly testified about the need to
expand the safety valve provision (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))
beyond drug offenses and FAMM's recent report on manda-
tory minimums also recommends expansion of the safety
valve. See Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of
Mandatory Minimums (2008).
35 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (West 2008). The "25 percent rule"
requires the top of the applicable Guideline range be no
greater than 25 percent of the bottom. The rule is one of the
reasons why the Sentencing Table comprises 243 cells. The
Commission should examine whether such a rule is useful in
a post-Booker advisory Guideline system.
36 The PROTECT Act amended section 994(a) to require that the
Guidelines be consistent with all applicable federal statutes.
The language was first introduced in 1995 (by Democrats)
after the Commission promulgated its amendment to the
Guidelines changing the ratio of crack cocaine and powder
cocaine from 100-to-1 to 1-to-1. The original language of the
Sentencing Reform Act required the Guidelines only to be
consistent with title 18, United States Code which, of course,
does not contain the drug trafficking statutes. Congress rein-
troduced the language in succeeding congresses and it was
finally enacted as part of the PROTECT Act.
37 The Commission's July 2008 symposium on alternatives to
incarceration brought together experts from across the coun-
try to share their experiences with implementing alternatives
to incarceration. The Commission should provide whatever
information it can to Congress on programs and approaches
demonstrated during the symposium that could work on the
federal level.
38 Congress also should include the Commission in whatever
federal task forces or review bodies that it establishes. For
example, the racial disparity bills introduced in the 1 10th
Congress included representatives from virtually every aspect
of the criminal justice system except the Commission. Yet the
Commission routinely interacts with these entities on matters
of sentencing policy and may be in the best position to pro-
vide useful information on sentencing practices, trends, and
policies. Congress should be sure to utilize the Commission
and the powers it gave it whenever possible. In turn, the Com-
mission should be prepared to take a leadership role in
sentencing policy development, including providing detailed
and in-depth studies and analyses on relevant issues.
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(2008).
40 S.3569, § 16 (2008). Pub. L. 110-406
41 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)(A).
42 I recognize and appreciate law enforcement concerns that
changing the law could lead to more drug trafficking and vio-
lence; however, that has to be weighed by community
perceptions of unfairness in the system. Congress must reach
an appropriate balance between these competing interests
and conclusively address this issue. I also understand the
Department's belief that cocaine sentencing reform should
be part of a larger examination of sentencing in this country
because of the myriad issues associated with it such as the
Commission's authority to give a Guideline retroactive effect.
That said, Congress has been considering this issue for more
than a decade. The time has long since passed for it to act.
Congress should seek from the Commission, the Depart-
ment, and other sources whatever information it deems
necessary to address this issue expeditiously.
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